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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KARL W. WINSNESS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880171 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant, Karl W. Winsness, was convicted for 
attempted first degree murder, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1990)1 and Utah Code 
Ann. 76-5-202 (1990) (amended 1991).2 This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-
2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to 
support defendant's conviction? In reviewing a jury verdict, 
this Court views the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom 
in the light most favorable to the verdict and will only 
1
 Although the attempt statute, section 76-4-101, was not 
expressly charged in the information, it is clear from the 
information, as well as the record on appeal that defendant was 
prosecuted and subsequently convicted for attempted first degree 
murder (Record [hereinafter R.] 41). 
2
 Section 76-5-202 has been amended since its application 
in this case, but the minor substantive and stylistic changes 
made have no material effect on the issues raised here. 
interfere when the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that 
a reasonable jury could not possibly have reached the verdict 
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 
(Utah 1989), cert, denied, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 1837 (1990). 
2. Is defendant precluded from challenging the jury 
instructions given? It is well established that "'[n]o party may 
assign as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom 
unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his 
objection. "• State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021-23 (Utah 1987) 
(quoting Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)). Moreover, where an instruction 
is submitted by a party, that same party cannot later object to 
it because he has already waived any objection and endorsed it as 
legally sound. State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App. 
1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Karl W. Winsness, was charged with 
attempted first degree murder, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1990) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-202 (1990) (amended 1991) (R. 41). Following a jury 
trial held April 12-14, 1988, defendant was convicted as charged 
(R. 46-50, 136). The trial court subsequently sentenced 
2 
defendant to a term of five years which may be for life at the 
Utah State Prison (R. 140). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the evening of January 1, 1988, several officers 
from the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office attempted to execute a 
no-knock search warrant for defendant's residence, located at 448 
North 900 West, Salt Lake City, Utah (Transcript of jury trial, 
April 12-14, 1988 [hereinafter T.] 66-72). Prior to execution of 
the no-knock warrant, at approximately 8:25 p.m., Officer Leslie 
Ann Taylor made an anonymous phone call to defendant's residence 
in an attempt to determine whether or not defendant was at home 
(T. 61). Officer Taylor asked the male individual who answered 
the phone at defendant's residence if he was "Willie," to which 
defendant replied, "Yeah[,] what do you want" (T. 61-62). 
Officer Taylor then responded, "I'll be there in a minute," and 
hung up the phone (T. 61-62). 
Shortly after receiving confirmation from Officer 
Taylor that defendant was on the premises, five deputy sheriffs 
and two probation and parole agents attempted to execute the 
warrant (T. 71-72). Officers Steve Alexander, Jerry Rigby, Keith 
Stevens, Kevin Judd and Keith Rogers positioned themselves on and 
around defendant's front porch, while Agents Gerald White and 
Gary Bortolussi proceeded to the back of the residence (T. 66-77, 
92-96, 112-15, 125-27, 147, 156-57, 196-99). Yelling "Sheriff's 
Office," Officer Alexander pulled the screen to the front door 
open, allowing Officer Rigby to kick it in (T. 72, 84, 95, 121). 
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As Officer Rigby kicked the front door, all five officers began 
yelling "Sheriff's Office" in order to alert those inside to 
their presence (T. 72-77, 83-84, 89-91, 96-98, 104, 115, 121, 
127, 131, 197). The door opened approximately six to twelve 
inches and immediately slammed shut again, forcing Officer Rigby 
to attempt a second kick which opened the door approximately six 
to fourteen inches (T. 72, 95, 116). Yelling "Sheriff's Office," 
Officer Stevens attempted to force the door open further, holding 
his weapon in his right hand (T. 73, 115-16). Immediately as he 
hit the door, Officer Stevens heard several gunshots, lasting 
approximately 1 to 1 and 1/2 seconds, and felt debris hitting his 
face (T. 115-117). Before ducking back out of the doorway, 
Officer Stevens observed defendant crouched down inside the 
residence, illuminated by flashes from the weapon he was firing 
(T. 118). The officers immediately sought cover and none of the 
officers returned fire (T. 77). 
From the time the officers first attempted entry to the 
cessation of defendant's gunfire, approximately three to five 
seconds passed (T. 75, 104, 109). In total, defendant fired 
approximately four or five shots in the general direction of the 
front door, one of which seriously wounded Officer Rogers (who 
had stepped up onto the porch following Officer Rigby's first 
kick) in his left arm and chest area (T. 75, 86, 96, 121, 127-
128, 196-98, 203). Two bullet holes were discovered on and 
around the front door jamb at heights of approximately five feet, 
eleven inches and six feet, and were estimated to have been fired 
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from a distance of approximately 20 feet (T. 136-38, 141-44). 
Apparently the bullet striking the door jamb proceeded up through 
the porch awning at a height of approximately eight feet (T. 139-
141). At the time police seized the .357 magnum from defendant's 
living room, it contained five rounds of live ammunition (T. 172-
73). 
Shortly after the shooting, Agent Bortolussi heard 
movement from inside the rear of the house and called out, "Karl, 
is that you," to which defendant replied, "Yes" (T. 158). Agent 
Bortolussi identified himself and asked if defendant remembered 
him (T. 158). In reply, defendant asked what was "going on out 
there," and indicated that he did not want to be shot and that he 
wanted to call his father (T. 158). Agent Bortolussi assured 
defendant that he would not be shot and instructed him to give 
himself up (T. 161). Defendant subsequently surrendered to 
police, approximately 20 minutes later (T. 163). While being 
transported to jail, defendant asked if a "cop" had been shot, 
and stated that he had been "scared" and "didn't know what to do" 
(T. 184). He further stated that he had called his father 
because "[he] didn't want to get shot [him]self" (T. 184). At 
the county jail defendant inquired as to the safety of his house 
and said he was sorry that the "cop" had been shot. He said, "I 
had to do something to protect me. It was self defense. Someone 
was kicking in your door, wouldn't you do it[?]" (T. 192). 
Defendant also asked about bail requirements and when he was 
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informed that there would be no bail he stated, "[T]hat's not 
fair[,] I only shot in self defense" (T. 192). 
Other facts will be presented in the body of this 
brief, as pertinent to specific arguments. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In Points I and II of his brief on appeal defendant 
asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support his 
conviction because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt (1) that when he fired at law enforcement officers who were 
attempting to execute a no-knock search warrant for his residence 
he intended to kill them, and (2) that his conduct was not 
justified as defense of habitation. In so arguing, defendant 
merely recounts a version of the facts most favorable to him, and 
has not complied with the "marshalling" requirement for 
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. Thus, while 
emphasizing the evidence that supported his position at trial, 
defendant has left it to this Court to determine what evidence 
actually supported his conviction. Therefore, this Court need 
not and should not consider his allegations of insufficiency. 
Alternatively, if the Court decides to address 
defendant's sufficiency argument, a review of the record in the 
light most favorable to the jury verdict reveals that defendant's 
conviction is amply supported by the evidence. 
As for defendant's allegations of error concerning the 
jury instructions, which are raised for the first time on appeal 
to this Court, he has failed to properly preserve those 
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allegations for review• Moreover, the instructions of which 
defendant complains were submitted by him to the trial court, and 
defendant affirmatively represented to the court that he had no 
objections to the instructions given. Because the doctrine of 
invited error prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial 
and then complaining of it on appeal, this Court should decline 
to review defendant's arguments. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH 
THE "MARSHALLING" REQUIREMENT, HIS CLAIM THAT 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
HIS CONVICTION SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED; 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION. 
Defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence 
to support his jury conviction of attempted first degree murder 
on the ground that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that when he fired at law enforcement officers who were 
attempting to execute a no-knock search warrant for his residence 
he intended to kill them (Br. of App. at 6). Specifically, 
defendant asserts that there is a "gap between the evidence that 
[he] shot his gun and the conclusion that [he] intended to 
unlawfully kill somebody" (Br. of App. at 7). In support of his 
assertion defendant merely reargues the evidence presented at 
trial and thus fails to demonstrate that even viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, it is 
insufficient to support his conviction (Br. of App. at 9-14). 
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Appellat€5 courts accord great deference to the jury's 
verdict. State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980). So long 
as some evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's 
findings, this Court will not disturb them. State v. Booker, 709 
P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)). Specifically, in reviewing a jury 
verdict, this Court views the evidence and all inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict and will 
only interfere when the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial 
that a reasonable jury could not possibly have reached the 
verdict beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 
273, 285 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 1837 
(1990); Lamm, 606 P.2d at 231. Furthermore, the defendant has 
the burden of establishing "that the evidence was so inconclusive 
or insubstantial that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime[.]" 
State v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980). See also 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989). Included in that 
burden is the obligation to "marshal all evidence supporting the 
jury's verdict and . . . then show how this marshaled evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict even when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict." State v. Scheel, 175 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 43, 44 (Utah App. Dec. 3, 1991) (quoting State v. Perdue, 
813 P.2d 1201, 1207 (Utah App. 1991)). See also Crookston v. 
Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 799-800 (Utah 1991); cf. 
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah 1990) (applying 
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"marshalling" requirement to challenge to trial court's findings 
of fact). 
Although defendant discusses most of the evidence 
adduced at trial, he fails to view that evidence in the light 
most favorable to the jury verdict and then demonstrate that so 
viewed, the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's 
verdict (Br, of App. at 8-13). Rather, defendant's brief 
recounts a version of the facts most favorable to him. "Thus, 
while 'emphasizing the evidence that supported his position,' 
defendant has left it to [this Court] to sort out what evidence 
actually supported the findings." Scheel, 175 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
44 (quoting Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 464 
(Utah App. 1991)). Because defendant has not demonstrated why 
the evidence at trial is so inconclusive that a reasonable jury 
could not have convicted him, this Court may properly decline to 
entertain the merits of his argument on appeal. Id.; Moore, 802 
P.2d at 738; Crookston, 817 P.2d at 800. 
Alternatively, should this Court decide to reach the 
merits of defendant's sufficiency argument, a review of the 
record in the light most favorable to the jury verdict reveals 
that defendant's conviction is amply supported by the evidence. 
It is well established that intent is rarely capable of proof by 
direct evidence. State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 
1982). Thus, "Utah law clearly permits the inference of such 
intent from the actions of a defendant considered in light of 
surrounding circumstances." Id.; State v. Dumas. 721 P.2d 502, 
9 
504 (Utah 1986) ("Intent is an element that often can be proved 
only by means of circumstantial evidence,"). Considering the 
circumstances surrounding the instant case, there is sufficient 
circumstantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably 
infer defendant's intent to kill. Specifically, the State 
introduced evidence that the officers attempting to execute the 
no-knock search warrant for defendant's residence that night 
identified themselves by yelling either "Sheriff's Office," or 
"Sheriff's Department," simultaneously with their efforts to kick 
in defendant's front door (T. 72-77, 83-84, 89-91, 96-98, 104, 
115, 121, 127, 131, 197). Almost immediately the officers heard 
several gunshots from inside defendant's residence (T. 115-117). 
Officer Stevens felt debris hitting his face and observed 
defendant crouched down inside the residence, illuminated by 
flashes from the weapon he was firing (T. 115-118). In total, 
the officers heard defendant fire approximately four or five 
shots in the general direction of the front door, one of which 
seriously wounded Officer Rogers in his left arm and chest area 
(T. 75, 86, 96, 121, 127-128, 196-98, 203). Officers 
investigating the shooting subsequently found two bullet holes on 
and around the front door jamb at heights of approximately five 
feet, eleven inches and six feet, and estimated that the shots 
had been fired from a distance of approximately 20 feet (T. 136-
38, 141-44). Apparently, the bullet striking the door jamb 
proceeded through to the exterior of the house and up through the 
porch awning at a height of approximately eight feet (T. 139-
10 
141). At the time police seized defendant's .357 magnum from his 
living room, it contained five rounds of live ammunition (T. 172-
73). 
Defendant, on the other hand, asserts that the 
circumstantial evidence in this case invites, rather than 
excludes, other reasonable hypotheses than guilt (Br. of App. at 
11-12). See State v. Castonquav, 663 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Utah 
1983). Specifically, defendant asserts that even assuming the 
officers did identify themselves, he simply did not hear their 
shouts of identification and that he merely fired warning shots 
at the officers, thinking that they were attempting to rob him 
(Br. of App. at 8-13; T. 222, 226, 231). 
Contrary to defendant's apparent view, the evidence 
relied upon by the jury need not refute contrary allegations made 
by the defendant, so long as the jury verdict, as in this case, 
is supported by substantial evidence. Lamm, 606 P.2d at 232. 
Defendant's jury obviously did not find his story credible, and 
the attendant facts and circumstances adequately support that 
conclusion. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S USE OF DEADLY FORCE IS NOT 
JUSTIFIED BY THE DEFENSE OF HABITATION. 
In Point II of his brief on appeal defendant again 
attacks the sufficiency of the evidence, asserting that his 
conduct was justified as defense of habitation (Br. of App. at 
15-18). Defendant further asserts that his requested defense of 
habitation instruction "failed to clarify the confusing aspects" 
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of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405 (1990) (setting forth the defense of 
habitation), that the sequence in which the instructions were 
read "[gave] the appearance" that the defense of habitation was 
not available to him, and that the jury was never instructed "on 
the respective burdens of proof" (Br. of App. at 19-21). As a 
result, defendant contends, he was denied "a fair trial under the 
Due Process clause of the constitutions of Utah3 and the United 
States because the jury did not have a clear guideline as to how 
to interpret and apply the vague wording of section 76-2-405" 
(Br. of App. at 21). As before, defendant's argument as to the 
sufficiency of the evidence lacks merit, and his challenges to 
the jury instructions given are not properly before this Court. 
A. Defense of Habitation. 
Section 76-2-405* gives a person the right to use 
3
 Because defendant only nominally alludes to his state 
constitutional rights and has provided no analysis based on state 
constitutional provisions, the State's analysis is limited to 
defendant's allegation of a federal constitutional violation. 
Similarly, this Court should not engage in a separate state 
constitutional analysis of defendant's claims. State v. 
Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988). 
* Section 76-2-405(1) provides in pertinent part: 
A person is justified in using force against 
another when and to the extent that he 
reasonably believes that the force is 
necessary to prevent or terminate the other's 
unlawful entry into or attack upon his 
habitation; however, he is justified in the 
use of force which is intended or likely to 
cause death or serious bodily injury only if: 
(a) the entry is made or attempted in a 
violent emd tumultuous manner, 
surreptitiously, or by stealth, and he 
reasonably believes that the entry is 
12 
reasonable force to "prevent" or "terminate" another's unlawful 
entry or attack upon his "habitation." State v. Gardiner, 814 
P.2d 568, 575 (Utah 1991); State v. Moritzskv, 771 P.2d 688, 690 
(Utah App. 1989) (section 76-2-405 provides that defense of one's 
habitation may justify the use of force); State v. Duran, 772 
P.2d 982, 985 (Utah App. 1989). However, in order to justify the 
use of force, or, as in this case, deadly force in defense of 
habitation, a person must have a reasonable belief that the 
degree of force used was necessary to prevent the intruders from 
committing a violent act or felony. State In re R.J.Z., 736 P.2d 
235, 236 (Utah 1987). Where it is also established that an entry 
was "'unlawful' and 'made or attempted by use of force, or in a 
violent and tumultuous manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, 
or for the purpose of committing a felony,'" the person's use of 
force will be presumed reasonable. .Id. (citing section 76-2-
405(2) ).5 For purposes of the defense of habitation statute, 
attempted or made for the purpose of 
assaulting or offering personal violence to 
any person, dwelling, or being in the 
habitation and he reasonably believes that 
the force is necessary to prevent the assault 
or offer of personal violence; or 
(b) he reasonably believes that the entry 
is made or attempted for the purpose of 
committing a felony in the habitation and 
that the force is necessary to prevent the 
commission of the felony. 
Section 76-2-405(2) provides: 
The person using force or deadly force in 
defense of habitation is presumed for the 
13 
this Court evaluates the reasonableness of a person's use of 
force under an objective standard. Id. 
This Court has previously noted that "[t]he first step 
in deciding whether any defendant is justified under section 76-
2-405 is to determine what burden of proof the defendant and the 
State are respectively required to carry." R.J.Z., 736 P.2d at 
236-37. Because the trial court in R.J.Z. had refused to make a 
finding as to whether the entry in that case was unlawful and 
forcible, this Court found it impossible to allocate the burden 
of proof and thus determine whether R.J.Z's use of force 
qualified for a legal presumption of reasonableness pursuant to 
subsection (2) of the statute. Therefore, this Court remanded 
R.J.Z. to allow the trial court to make those factual findings. 
Id. 
Contrary to R.J.Z., the trial court in this case 
clearly instructed the jury that the officers attempted entry of 
defendant's home was lawful in accordance with a valid search 
warrant (R. 121; Jury Instruction #26). Thus, notwithstanding 
the violent and tumultuous manner in which entry was attempted in 
this case, the presumption of reasonableness in subsection (2) 
purpose of both civil and criminal cases to 
have acted reasonably and had a reasonable 
fear of imminent peril of death or serious 
bodily injury if the entry or attempted entry 
is unlawful and is made or attempted by use 
of force, or in a violent and tumultuous 
manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, or 
for the purpose of committing a felony. 
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has no application here because the attempted entry of identified 
police officers was lawful. Cf.. Gardiner, 814 P. 2d at 576 
(concluding that the legislature intended section 76-2-405 to 
exclude from its operation peace officers acting in the course of 
their duties). 
Where, as here, the defendant's use of deadly force is 
not entitled to a presumption of reasonableness, in order to 
avail himself of the defense of habitation the defendant must 
show that he was defending his habitation from a violent, 
tumultuous, surreptitious, or stealthy entry; that he reasonably 
believed that the entry was to do violence or commit a felony; 
and that he reasonably believed that his use of deadly force was 
necessary to prevent the violence or felony. R.J.Z., 736 P.2d at 
236. To be successful in this type of affirmative defense, the 
defendant need only create a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 
State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211, 213-215 (Utah 1985). The State's 
burden of establishing each element of the offense beyond a 
reasonable doubt remains unaffected. JEd. at 214. 
As noted previously in Point I of this brief, the 
evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support the jury's 
verdict. Specifically, the State introduced evidence that the 
officers attempting to execute the no-knock search warrant for 
defendant's residence identified themselves by yelling either 
"Sheriff's Office," or "Sheriff's Department," simultaneously 
with Officer Rigby's efforts to kick in defendant's front door 
(T. 72-77, 83-84, 89-91, 96-98, 104, 115, 121, 127, 131, 197). 
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That evidence, obviously believed by the jury, established that, 
although the officer's attempted entry was violent and 
tumultuous, defendant could not have reasonably believed that the 
purpose of the attempted entry was to do violence or commit a 
felony; thus, he could not have reasonably believed that his use 
of deadly force was necessary to prevent the commission of 
violence or a felony. R.J.Z., 736 P.2d at 236. Significantly, 
in his brief on appeal, defendant concedes that "[i]f he knew 
they were police armed with a search warrant when they began 
breaking through, the reasonable grounds would not exist" (Br. of 
App. at 17). However, defendant contends that due to an alleged 
disagreement among the evidence presented as 
to whether and how the officers identified 
themselves, the short amount of time 
involved, [his] surprise, his expectations 
that someone was coming to get even with him, 
and also because of the considerable noise 
and confusion, there is reasonable doubt as 
to whether or not [he] knew they were the 
police. 
(Br. of App. 17). 
Defendant's claim that his use of deadly force in this 
instance was justified as defense of habitation is unsupported by 
any evidence except his self-serving testimony that he believed 
he was about to be robbed because the officers either failed to 
identify themselves, or he did not hear them yell their identity 
during the attempted execution of the search warrant (T. 222-
231). The jury was certainly entitled to consider this 
explanation and disregard defendant's justification of his 
conduct, for it is within the jury's province to determine the 
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facts from any conflicting evidence. State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 
475, 477 (Utah 1989); State v. Buel, 700 P.2d 701, 703 (Utah 
1985). As noted previously, defendant's jury simply did not 
find his story credible, and the attendant facts and 
circumstances adequately support that conclusion. State v. Lamm, 
606 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1980) (where jury verdict is supported by 
substantial evidence, the evidence relied upon by the jury need 
not refute contrary allegations made by the defendant). 
B. Jury Instructions. 
It is well established that "'[n]o party may assign as 
error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating distinctly 
the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection.'" 
State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021-23 (Utah 1987) (quoting Utah R. 
Crim. P. 19(c)). Rule 19(c) requires more than a general 
exception to the instructions; rather, the rule "requires that 
the matter excepted to and the ground therefor be distinctly 
stated." State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591 594 (Utah 1988). Where, 
as here, "no grounds are apparent from the text of the 
instruction and no objection is stated, the objection is presumed 
waived." State v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1986). 
Not only did defendant fail to state his objections to 
the jury instructions below, but he affirmatively represented to 
the court that he had no objections (T. 268). Moreover, on 
appeal to this Court, defendant fails to acknowledge his failure 
to object below, and makes no argument that this Court should 
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nonetheless consider his allegations in order to avoid manifest 
injustice- See Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c); Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023-
Furthermore, the doctrine of invited error "prohibits a party 
from setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it on 
appeal." State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah App. 1991) 
(citing State v. Henderson, 114 Wash.2d 867, 792 P.2d 514, 516 
(1990)). See also State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 
1989); State v. Gleason, 17 Utah 2d 150, 405 P.2d 793, 795 (Utah 
1965). 
The first instruction of which defendant complains is 
the defense of habitation instruction6 which he requested and 
which the court used (R. 120, jury instruction #25; compare R. 
6
 Jury instruction #25 which tracks the statutory 
language of section 76-2-405 reads as follows: 
A person is justified in using force against 
another when he reasonably believes that the 
force is necessary to prevent or terminate 
the other's unlawful entry into or attack 
upon his habitation; however, he is justified 
in the use of force which is intended or 
likely to cause death or serious bodily 
injury only if: 
1. The entry is made or attempted in a 
violent and tumultuous manner and he 
reasonably believes that the entry is 
attempted or made for the purpose of 
assaulting or offering personal violence to 
any person, dwelling or being therein and 
that the force is necessary to prevent the 
assault or offer of personal violence; or 
2. He reasonably believes that the entry is 
made or attempted for the purpose of 
committing a felony therein and that such 
force is necessary to prevent the commission 
of the felony. 
(R. 120). See supra, n.4 of this brief setting forth section 76« 
2-405. 
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65, defendant's requested jury instruction #3). Defendant also 
complains "the jury was never instructed on the respective burden 
of proof" (Br. of App. at 20). However, contrary to his 
allegations on appeal, defendant in fact requested an instruction 
on his burden of proof which was accepted and given by the 
court7 (R. 126, jury instruction #31; compare R. 68, defendant's 
requested jury instruction #6). Moreover, the jury was clearly 
instructed as to the State's burden to prove each element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 99, 102, jury instructions 
#3 and #7). As for defendant's complaint about the order in 
which the defense of habitation instruction (jury instruction 
#25) and the lawful entry instruction (jury instruction #268) 
were read to the jury, defendant did not object to this order 
below. Furthermore, the court clearly instructed the jurors that 
"[t]he order in which the instructions are given has no 
Jury instruction #31 reads as follows: 
The defendant bears no burden of proof on the 
issue of self-defense or defense of 
habitation. If, based upon the evidence of 
the entire case, there is a reasonable doubt 
as to whether or not he acted in self-defense 
or in defense of his habitation, you must 
acquit the defendant. 
Jury instruction #26 reads as follows: 
You are instructed that the attempted entry 
of defendant's home by peace officers was 
lawful in accordance with a lawfully issued 
search warrant. 
(R. 121). 
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significance as to their relative importance" (R. 108, jury 
instruction #13). 
Where, as here, defendant submitted the instructions 
used by the trial court which he claims were defective, and 
affirmatively represented that he had no objections to the 
instructions given, this Court should decline to review his 
assignments of error. Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023 (Court declined 
to consider unobjected-to instruction where defense counsel 
actively represented to the lower court that she had read the 
instruction and had no objection to it); Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1205 
(concluding that where an instruction is submitted by a party, 
that same party cannot later object to it because he or she has 
already waived any objection and endorsed it as legally sound). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
this Court to affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this day of January, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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